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Abstract
Various aspects of poverty in Croatia are still insufficiently well researched. Not
only is there no knowledge about how long Croatian citizens remain poor, but there are
also some disagreements about the actual number of the poor and the choice of the
national poverty line. Nor has there been any precise evaluation of the effects of the
individual anti-poverty policy measures. The objective of this paper was to analyse the
basic indicators of the scope and distribution of poverty, the risk groups and the struc-
ture of the population of the poor and to investigate the role of social transfers in the
reduction of poverty. The paper consists of four parts and an introduction. In Part 1
there is an analysis of the trends in the numbers of the poor in Croatia at the beginning
of the millennium and the profile of poverty. The second part deals with the policy for
the reduction or elimination of poverty, while in Part 3 the author deals with the prob-
lem of selecting the official poverty line and the role of the minimum income in Croatia.
Part 4 contains the conclusions. Using the official EU poverty line, a comparative
analysis shows that the rates of relative poverty in Croatia do not deviate greatly from
the EU mean, although Croatia does have a somewhat higher rate of poverty than most
of the countries in the Union. Most at risk of falling below the poverty line are the elder-
ly, the retired and the unemployed, single-person households, single-parent families and
families with three or more children. The total system of social transfers is not less effec-
tive than the transfer systems of most of the countries of the EU. If we exclude old age
and survivor pensions from the social transfers, in fact, Croatia has the most effective
social transfers of any of the countries observed. However, on the other hand, the pover-
ty rate reduction due to old age and survivor pensions is one of the lowest in the coun-
tries compared.
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Introduction
Today’s research into poverty in the advanced countries has really little to offer in
the shape of new insights into poverty or anti-poverty policies. Almost all aspects of the
life of the poor have been subject to meticulous examination (Becker, 1997). However,
this can hardly be said for poverty research in Croatia, which only started a few years
ago. It is glaringly obvious that the dynamics of poverty in Croatia have been insuffi-
ciently researched. There is no knowledge about how long Croatian families remain
poor and what strategies they use in their endeavours to escape the poverty trap. Apart
from that, there is even a certain amount of disagreement about how widespread pover-
ty is in Croatia. There are still dilemmas about which lines and equivalence scales to use
during research into poverty because no national or official poverty line has been adopt-
ed. It should be said that the selection of the poverty line or equivalence scale has a con-
siderable effect on the number of the poor, while the profile of poverty (the composition
of those who are poor) is more stable and less dependent on the poverty line or equiva-
lence scales used (Tsakloglou, 1998).
Partly as a result of research into poverty in Croatia being late in comparison with
the developed and some of the transition countries (in which poverty research started in
the eighties or the beginning of the nineties), official policy against poverty has not been
completely defined. Although two years ago the Programme for Combating Poverty and
Social Exclusion was adopted (Vlada RH, 2002), to date the effects of given measures
of this Programme have not been evaluated with any degree of thoroughness. It should
be said that the instruments in the fight against poverty are fairly well known, and the
countries differ from each other according to which group of measures they lay greater
stress upon and which less. Our attention in this paper will be directed towards social
transfers, one of the essential elements in the anti-poverty policy. Social transfers (var-
ious benefits in the social security system) have an important role in all countries in the
prevention and reduction of poverty. From the point of view of poverty reduction, the
most important social transfers are pensions, unemployment benefits, family benefits,
and welfare benefits. The effectiveness of these benefits can most simply be evaluated
according to the number of households that are in receipt of such benefits, and accord-
ing to the amount of the benefit. The number of beneficiaries of given social transfers
will depend in each country on the demographic and socio-economic structure of the
population and the institutional organisation of the social security system (Deleeck, Van
den Bosch and De Lathouwer, 1995). For example, it is known that in the Nordic coun-
tries almost all households with children receive family benefits, unlike the countries in
Southern Europe, in which family support programmes are poorly developed. From the
standpoint of poverty, a key question is how much social transfers are aimed at the poor,
that is, the extent to which the poor participate in given social programmes.
Although Croatia has relatively high social expenditures (about 26% of GDP),
many are of the opinion that they are not sufficiently effective in the reduction of
inequality and poverty (World Bank, 2000). The first analyses have shown that expen-
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ditures inside the large programmes (pensions) are less strongly oriented towards the
poor, while those programmes on which fewer financial resources are spent (welfare
benefits) are directed more strongly to the impoverished. But a better insight into the
effectiveness of transfers will be given by a comparative analysis, through which we can
compare the effectiveness of the Croatian transfer system with the transfer systems of
developed and transitional countries.
1. Poverty in Croatia at the turn of the millennium: basic indicators
Unlike many developed countries in which there is a long tradition of the academ-
ic tracking of poverty (longer than a century in some countries) it was only at the end of
the 20th century that Croatia started to address the issue of poverty in a methodological-
ly appropriate manner. For the pre-1998 period there are no relevant indicators of pover-
ty in Croatia capable of serving comparative purposes. It is well known that poverty as
research topic in the socialist period was neglected, was not, in fact, admitted to be a
serious social problem (Šuæur, 2001; 2003). The socialist system was, after all, founded
on the ideology of radical egalitarianism. Apart from that, all the way to the 1980s
Croatia had a relatively high rate of economic growth and low unemployment rates (but
high rates of hidden unemployment). Although social protection was guaranteed only to
the employed, since the unemployment rates were very low, the social protection sys-
tem was indeed universal and comprehensive. Thanks to the governmental subsidies
given to the basic necessities and services, the costs of living were maintained at a very
low level, the result being that very few individuals lived below the threshold of physi-
ological existence. It was considered at the time that poverty was not a significant social
problem. When the concept of full employment was jeopardised, poverty became much
more widespread. In addition, in the 1990s, the war and the occupation of part of the
country delayed academic research into the problem of poverty.
Table 1 Poverty rates in Croatia (2001-2003) in %
2001 2002 2003
Poverty line as % Monetary Only Monetary Only Monetary Only
of the median income monetary income monetary income monetary
national income and income income and income income and income income
in kind in kind in kind
40 5.8 10.7 6.3 9.8 5.2 6.8
50 10.5 15.3 11.7 15.4 10.2 12.1
60 17.2 20.5 18.2 21.9 16.9 18.9
70 24.1 27.5 26.0 29.7 24.6 25.7
Note: During the calculation of the poverty rate, the modified OECD equivalence scale was used
(head of the household = 1; other adults in the household=0.5; children younger than 14 = 0.3).
Source: DZS, 2004.
In fact, it is only in the last few years that it has been possible to follow trends in
poverty according to a uniform criterion. In order to be able to monitor poverty during
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a given period, it is important to have a representative sample, to use the same poverty
line and the same equivalence scales and to have identical questionnaires to gather infor-
mation about the well-being of individuals and households. These conditions were met
only in the 2001-2003 period, although the first representative research into poverty was
carried out as far back as 1998 (World Bank, 2000). The main shortcoming of this study
was that the sample did not cover the whole of the population of Croatia, because the
occupied areas of Eastern Slavonia and Dalmatinska Zagora remained outside the sam-
ple. Apart from that, the poverty rates and other indicators from the research were based
on consumption and not income. Since Eurostat prefers income in all its calculations
about poverty (because of the simpler gathering of information and calculation of the
poverty indicators involved), the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS/DZS) started, for
the sake of international comparability, to use income as indicator of well-being. The
move from consumption to income as resource base brought about changes in the selec-
tion of the poverty line as well. Instead of an absolute poverty line, a relative poverty
line is now used. As can be seen from Table 1, poverty rates in the 2001-2003 period
obtained according to the official EU poverty line (60% of the equivalent of the median
national income) ranged between 17 and 18% (if we include in income both monetary
and in-kind income). The concept of income in kind includes all the household
“receipts” in some non-monetary form (e.g., food produced on the household’s own
land, gifts in the form of material goods, the performance of work in exchange for food
or material goods and the like).
If we compare the poverty rates with respect to the 40, 50, 60 and 70% of the medi-
an national income, we can see the scattering of individuals or households around the
poverty threshold (60% of the median). If we take into account total income (monetary
and in-kind), if we raise the poverty line from 40 to 50% of the median income, the pover-
ty rates rise by about 5%. Above 50% of the median the poverty rates rise with a faster
tempo (from 7-8%). On the other hand, tabular figures also tell us of the importance of
income in kind for the life of a rather considerable number of individuals (Table 2).
Table 2 The impact of income in kind on rates of poverty reduction in Croatia 
(2001-2003)  in %
Poverty line as % of the Poverty rate reduction
median national income due to income in kind
2001 2002 2003
40 4.9 3.5 1.6
50 4.8 3.7 1.9
60 3.3 3.7 2.0
70 3.4 3.7 1.1
Thanks to income in kind, the poverty rates in 2001 were 3.5-5% lower, depending
on the poverty line adopted. But it is clear that year by year income in kind is being
reduced as a percentage of total income (in 2003 the rate of poverty reduction due to
income in kind comes to 1-2%, depending on the poverty line).
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In addition, figures from Table 1 show a certain dynamics in poverty. It can be seen
that poverty rates, irrespective of the poverty line, rose in 2002 about 1%, while in 2003
a fall in the poverty rate was recorded, that is a return to the 2001 level. If we restrict
ourselves only to the relative poverty line defined as 60% of the median national
income, then in 1999 and 2000, according to unofficial estimates (Kaliterna-Lipovèan
et al., 2003), the poverty rates came to 17.1 and 16.2%, while in 1998 there were 19.4%
poor1, but measured according to the poverty line of 66% of the median of consumption
(Luttmer, 2000). This means that the poverty rates in the 1998-2003 period oscillated
between 1 and 2%. It appears that, according to the indicators educed, it is possible to
talk of a stagnant character of poverty in Croatia. There are no marked reductions or
rises in poverty rates in the country.
Figure 1 Poverty rates in Croatia and selected EU countries (2001) in %
1 This poverty rate refers to the sample in which the areas of Eastern Slavonia and Dalmatinska Zagora were
not included. According to estimates, if these areas were involved in the sample, the poverty rate would be increased
by about one fifth.
Note: The poverty line is defined as 60% of the median national income. Poverty indicators refer
to the monetary income and not to in-kind income. EU 10 covers the 10 countries that joined on May
1, 2004. The reference year for Lithuania and Slovenia is 2000, and for Slovakia 2003.
Source: DZS, 2004.
In comparison with most EU countries, Croatia has a somewhat higher rate of
poverty (Fig. 1). Still, in some countries in the EU (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain) the poverty rates are almost identical to that in Croatia. But Denmark, Germany,
the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Slovenia have practically half the poverty rate of
Croatia.
1.1 The composition of the poor and groups with above-average poverty risks
Poverty is as a rule linked with certain social and demographic features (for exam-
ple, sex, age, education, household structure, economic activity and the like), although
the profile of poverty in the developed countries differs from the structure of the poor in
less developed or undeveloped countries. Tables 3 and 4 show the differences in the
poverty rates in Croatia taking into consideration sex, age and economic activity. 
Table 3 Poverty rates in Croatia according to age and sex
(Poverty line = 60% of the median national income)
Age and sex groups 2001 2002 2003
Monetary Only Monetary Only Monetary Only
income monetary income monetary income monetary
and income income and income income and income income
in kind in kind in kind
0-15 15.9 21.3 16.7 21.7 15.2 16.6
M 13.9 20.3 17.9 22.9 15.6 16.4
F 18.0 22.5 15.4 20.3 14.7 16.7
16-24 15.2 18.3 16.4 20.4 15.4 17.2
M 16.9 19.3 19.0 24.4 16.2 17.0
F 13.6 17.3 13.5 16.1 14.6 17.3
25-49 13.3 17.5 13.9 17.6 12.5 14.2
M 12.6 17.3 14.0 17.4 12.4 14.0
F 14.0 17.8 13.7 17.8 12.7 14.3
50-64 14.7 17.0 17.6 21.3 15.5 16.7
M 13.8 15.9 16.9 21.2 15.4 16.7
F 15.5 18.0 18.3 21.4 15.5 16.6
65 and over 28.5 29.7 29.0 31.6 27.9 32.2
M 23.5 24.9 25.6 27.8 23.6 28.6
F 31.8 32.9 31.2 34.0 30.6 34.4
Total
M 15.4 19.1 17.7 21.6 15.8 17.7
F 18.7 21.8 18.6 22.2 17.9 20.1
Source: DZS, 2004.
Some groups have higher poverty rates, and hence a greater relative poverty risk.
The relative poverty risk tells about what the likelihood is of the members of some group
being poor as compared with the average poverty risk in the whole society. This risk is
defined as the ratio of the poverty rate of the given group and the overall poverty rate in
society. For example, a group the relative poverty risk of which is 1 has an average
poverty risk; members of a group with a poverty risk of 1.6 have a 60% greater chance
of becoming poor than the average, while members of a group with a relative poverty
risk of 0.5 have a 50% lower chance than average of becoming impoverished. The rel-
ative poverty risk is not always an indicator of the composition of the poor. Thus a group
that has the greatest relative poverty risk does not have to be the most numerous among
the poor (this is often characteristic of the unemployed). In order to be able to calculate
a certain group as a percentage of the poor population, we have to multiply the relative
poverty risk by the percentage of the total population represented by this group.
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Tables 3 and 4 show that the greatest poverty risk, with respect to age and econom-
ic activity, is present among the elderly, the retired and the unemployed. The category
of old persons includes all persons older than 64. There is an important overlap between
retired persons and older persons (retirees are the most numerous group among the
elderly). However, not all old persons are retirees, and not all pensioners are over 64. It
is interesting nevertheless to point out that all categories according to economic activi-
ty, apart from the employed, have an above-average relative poverty risk (the self-
employed, unemployed, pensioners and other economically inactive people) (Table 4).
Self-employed persons have poverty rates only a little lower than retirees and econom-
ically inactive persons. In addition, it has been shown that some types of household are
more at risk of poverty: primarily, these are single-person households, one-parent fam-
ilies and couples with three or more children (Table 5).
Table 4 Poverty rates in Croatia according to economic activity
(Poverty line = 60% of the median national income)
2001 2002 2003
Groups according to Monetary Only Monetary Only Monetary Only
type of economic income monetary income monetary income monetary
activity and income income and income income and income income
in kind in kind in kind
employed 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.5 5.2 5.6
self-employed 20.1 38.0 19.0 37.6 18.4 25.5
unemployed 32.2 32.6 35.0 38.1 32.4 34.1
retirees 21.3 19.8 23.2 24.0 20.7 22.4
other economically inactive 20.0 25.5 21.3 26.1 20.3 22.6
Source: DZS, 2004.
Table 5 Poverty rates in the Republic of Croatia according to type of household
(Poverty line = 60% of the median national income)
Type of household 2001 2002 2003 
Monetary Only Monetary Only Monetary Only
income monetary income monetary income monetary
and income income and income income and income income




both younger than 65 33.3 31.1 35.1 38.3 34.7 37.3
two adults without
dependent children; both
younger than 65 11.9 14.8 16.3 21.0 11.8 13.3
two adults without
dependent children; at least
one is older than 64 27.5 27.3 30.1 32.8 26.1 30.4
single parent households with
one or more dependent children 28.9 27.1 27.7 36.6 29.1* 31.8 *
two adults with one child 13.0 14.3 11.2 14.5 14.9 14.7
two adults with two children 14.9 19.3 12.8 16.8 13.7 15.2
two adults with three
or more children 15.9 30.0 24.9 32.1 19.1 21.6
* Insufficiently reliable estimate.
Source: DZS, 2004.
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From Table 3 we can see that women in general have a somewhat higher poverty
rate than men.
Nevertheless, when the rates for male and female poverty in certain phases of the
life cycle are compared, then it is clear that differences in sexually defined rates of
poverty appear only in old age. In 2003 the poverty rate for older women was 7% high-
er than the poverty rate for older men (in 2001 this difference was actually in excess of
8%). In all the other age categories there are no important differences between the
poverty of men and the poverty of women. It appears then that the poverty rates of per-
sons over 64 are practically twice the poverty rates of other age groups. Older persons
have a 70% greater chance of being poor than the average Croatian citizen (Fig. 2).
Figure 2 Relative poverty risk for persons over 64 (average = 1)
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Note: Income includes monetary and in-kind income. Poverty line = 60% of the median national
income.
Retirees
Retirees have a 6-8% lower rate of poverty than the older population in general
(Tables 3 and 4). The reason for this is that some of the older persons do not have any
pension receipts. The relative poverty risk of pensioners is greater than the average in
all three reference years (Fig. 3).
In 2003 the financial position of retired persons improved markedly (a fall in the
poverty rate of 2.5%) but the relative poverty risk still remained above the average,
for the overall poverty rate was reduced by 1.3% (Table 1). It seems that a certain rise
in pensions in 2003 did not essentially modify the overall material position of retired
persons. They are still one of the most numerous groups of the poor. It is interesting
that the difference in the poverty rates between male and female pensioners in 2003
was less than 1%, while in 2002 there were even more poor male pensioners than
female.
Figure 3 Relative poverty risk for retired persons (average = 1)
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Note: Income includes monetary and in-kind income. Poverty line = 60% of the median national
income.
The unemployed
The figures confirm the well-known fact that the unemployed as a rule have the
greatest relative poverty risk of all groups (almost twice the average) (Figure 4). Of
course, not all groups of the unemployed are in the same position. It can thus be assumed
that the positions, at least over the short-term, of those unemployed who receive unem-
ployment benefit (however small and short in duration) and those who do not receive
any such benefit are different.
















Note: Income includes monetary and in-kind income. Poverty line = 60% of the median national
income.
As with other groups, the poverty rate of the unemployed rose in 2002, and then in
2003 dropped back to the 2001 level (Table 4). However, it seems that unemployment
has a more negative effect on the material status of men than of women. Only in this
group do men have a much greater relative poverty risk than women. Apart from that,
this risk is increasing year by year, while the risk for unemployed women has actually
fallen (although not considerably). Probably when they are unemployed women are able
to rely more on the financial support of their spouses or other members of the family
(incomes of men are considerably larger on average than those of women). 
Single person and one-parent family households
In Croatia single person households have a higher poverty risk than households with
a larger number of members (Fig. 5). In 2003 the relative poverty risk for single person
households was more than twice the average (Tables 1 and 5). Those single-person
households in which elderly women live are particularly at risk.
A larger number of children in a household in which two adults live is not such an
important risk as some other traits. The poverty risk for a couple with three or more chil-
dren is approximately average, except in 2002. But single-parenthood is very much linked
with life in poverty (which is in accord with all foreign research). We can see that in 2001
and 2003 the relative poverty risk for single-parent families with one or more children was
70% higher than the average. Clearly, in the future more attention has to be devoted to this
kind of family in which there are children, for the number of one-parent families is on the
rise (although the number is not as great as it is in the most developed countries).
Figure 5 Relative poverty risk for certain types of households (average = 1)
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Note: Income includes monetary and in-kind income. Poverty line = 60% of the median national income.
2. Anti-poverty policy
Dealing with poverty is principally aimed at finding ways for the reduction or elim-
ination of it. Anti-poverty policy includes institutions, measures and programmes aimed
at the alleviation or eradication of poverty. Via these programmes the living conditions
of people who live in poverty, it is hoped, can be improved and the conditions be creat-
ed for the elimination of extreme and absolute poverty. In the achievement of these
objectives countries have used and still use various packages of measures. Most coun-
tries shape their own strategies for the reduction and prevention of poverty. Similarly
some countries or groups of countries have various views about individual anti-poverty
policies, depending on their traditions and dominant political ideologies.
In general there are four basic pillars in the policy against poverty: 1. economic
growth and the improvement of the chances of getting employed, 2. investment in the
development of human capital, 3. progressive tax policy (fiscal welfare) and 4. social
transfers (income support).
Economic growth is necessary in the battle against poverty but it will not necessar-
ily by itself cancel out poverty (which can be widespread even in countries that have
high rates of growth and employment). Certainly, the influence of economic growth on
the reduction of poverty is the result of a set of factors, among which dynamics of
employment, wage policy and redistribution mechanisms must be picked out.
Public expenditures in the human capital of the poor constitute an important instru-
ment in the reduction and prevention of poverty over the long term. Good education and
health care help the poor to have a more productive life. Empirical studies have found a
very close correlation between the level of education and poverty. Education affects the
level of productivity, because it provides individuals with the necessary knowledge and
skills. If greater productivity in the workplace is reflected in higher income and partici-
pation in the labour market, then there is no doubt that education is the chief channel of
social mobility. In brief, higher levels of human capital are linked with higher levels of
income, and if people can earn higher incomes, there is less of a likelihood that they will
live in poverty. Anti-poverty policy in the area of education in the developed countries
is more linked with enabling access to tertiary education. Measures aimed at providing
greater educational chances to the poor can include government loans and scholarships,
subsidising the costs of housing, food and so on. Apart from regular education, the role
of further training, i.e., the acquisition of specific kinds of knowledge and skills outside
the regular school system is also important for the attainment of advantageous market
and income positions. But it is clear that the problem of poverty cannot be solved only
by educational reform and higher educational aspirations. Higher educational achieve-
ments are not enough to compensate for an inadequate supply of jobs or the high com-
petitiveness of the contemporary (globalised) labour market. A person’s educational
attainments, what is more, can be cancelled out by employer discrimination against them
because of age or sex. For this reason educational attainments have to be followed up by
other factors that affect employment, salary policies and so on.
Tax and other redistributive mechanisms also determine how much individuals or
groups will benefit from economic growth. An anti-poverty policy certainly cannot be
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primarily run via the taxation system (which has other functions) but it is true that the
type of tax system can powerfully affect the level of poverty and inequality (a progres-
sive tax system will in principle reduce inequality and poverty). The direct impact of
taxation policy on poverty is brought about via tax allowances for families that annual-
ly earn less than a certain level of income. In addition, certain social transfers can be
exempted from taxation (child benefits, disability benefits and so on). Nevertheless, tax-
ation policy has only a limited effect on poverty, for families with low incomes often are
unable to make use of the tax concessions available to other taxpayers (simply because
they do not pay income tax).2
Our analysis of anti-poverty policy will be restricted to a consideration of the role
of social transfers. Experience shows that the only efficient policy in the fight against
poverty is the one which combines the provision of employment with appropriate
income support. For this reason, in addition to the stimulation of economic growth, it is
essential to develop the social safety net which will provide security for individuals
exposed to certain risks or hit by reforms and structural adjustments. We can distinguish
between the first-tier and the second-tier social safety net. Along with some universal
programmes (child and family benefits), the first-tier safety net relates mainly to the pro-
grammes of social security that enable the replacement of lost income in precisely deter-
mined circumstances such as retirement, sickness, accidents at work, maternity, death of
a breadwinner and so on. Social security programmes are not immediately aimed at the
alleviation of poverty; rather it is their role to make up for lost income from work that
individuals have lost through no fault of their own. These programmes are not means-
tested, but depend on contributions records, which means that such benefits can be
obtained by all who meet the conditions (age, continuity of employment in a given peri-
od and so on), irrespective of the level of their income. The social security system is not
an adequate defence against poverty, because a considerable number of people are not
covered by these programmes, particularly in situations of falling employment. If the
social safety net is inadequate or contains holes, it is possible to expect greater problems
in the fight against poverty. The inadequacy of social security from the point of view of
the anti-poverty policy can be seen in insufficiently developed programmes, low level
of benefits and difficulties in accessing various services. Croatia is currently faced with
the problem of low benefits and difficulties of access to the social services.
Another important mechanism for income support for the poor is welfare assistance,
a basic social transfer in the context of the second-tier safety net. This involves pro-
grammes meant for or aimed exclusively at the poor and that include an obligatory
means test. The main objective of welfare assistance or means-tested transfers is to pre-
vent extreme impoverishment and social exclusion (Heikkilä and Kuivalainen, 2002).
Contemporary anti-poverty programmes privilege targeting over universality in a situa-
tion in which there are pressures upon welfare expenditures.
Anti-poverty policies mainly encompass measures and programmes that are
financed and put through by the Government or the state. However, international and
national strategies in the fight against poverty increasingly insist that the anti-poverty
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2 There are ways in which low-income families can make use of their tax concessions, for example, if tax
concessions in the income allowances were replaced by concessions in the form of tax concessions or tax credits.
policy should be comprehensive, particularly in view of the largely accepted view that
poverty cannot be reduced to the mere absence of material or financial resources (pover-
ty as a multi-dimensional phenomenon). This means that in the shaping and implemen-
tation of anti-poverty policy measures various stakeholders need to act in coordination:
institutions of the central government, local communities and organisations of civil soci-
ety and the clients themselves. 
2.1. The role of pensions and other social transfers in the reduction and alleviation
of poverty
In order to determine to what extent social transfers in total or individually affect
the poverty reduction rates, it is simplest to compare so-called pre-transfer income with
post-transfer income (Deleeck and Van den Bosch, 1992; Deleeck, Van den Bosch and
De Lathouwer, 1995). Pre-transfer income implies current income from which all or cer-
tain social transfers are excluded, while post-transfer income relates to total available
income from all sources (wages, social transfers, profits and so on). First, the number of
poor people is ascertained, so that transfers are excluded from income, and then an
analysis is made of how much social transfers, when they are included in total income,
contribute to the reduction in the number of the poor. In this manner it is possible to
ascertain which social transfers are more and which are less effective from the viewpoint
of the reduction of poverty.
Figure 6 Poverty rates with respect to income structure (2001 in %)
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Note: The poverty line is defined as 60% of the median national income. Indicators of poverty relate
only to monetary income (without income in kind). The EU 10 includes the 10 countries that entered the
EU on May 1, 2004. The reference year for Lithuania and Slovenia is 2000, and for Slovakia 2003.
Source: DZS, 2004.
Figure 6 shows differences in poverty rates depending on whether pensions and other
social transfers are included or not. It should be pointed out that the concept of pensions
relates only to old-age and survivor pensions and not to disability pensions. On the other
hand, the concept of “other social transfers” includes benefits or receipts related to unem-
ployment, child benefits, maternity benefits, layette benefits, sick leave benefits (over 42
days), welfare assistance, benefits for physical impairments and other people’s care, ben-
efits for rehabilitation or employment of disabled persons, scholarships and receipts for
education and receipts from other persons for housing. This distinction between “other
social transfers” on the one hand and old-age and survivor pensions on the other is done
according to the Eurostat methodology, for the sake of comparability with EU countries.
If we analyse the effectiveness of pensions and other social transfers together, it will
appear that Croatia has a relatively effective transfer system as compared with other
countries (Figures 6 and 7). Thanks to pensions and other social transfers, the poverty
rate reduction in Croatia is greater than the EU average (the 15 and the 10 taken togeth-
er or separately). In fact, countries can be classified into four groups with respect to the
degree to which poverty is reduced: countries in which the rate of poverty reduction is
greater than 30% (Sweden, Hungary and Poland), countries in which the rate of pover-
ty reduction ranges between 25 and 30% (Croatia, France, German, Austria, Czech R,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania), countries with a poverty reduction rate between 20
and 25% (Denmark, Italy, UK and Estonia) and countries with a poverty reduction rate
lower than 20% (Greece, Ireland and Portugal).
Figure 7 The impact of pensions and other social transfers on poverty reduction rates,
(2001 in %)
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DEN GER GRE ITA IRL AUS POR FRA SWE CZR SVK SLO HUN POL EST LATUK
rate of poverty reduction thanks
to other social transfers
rate of poverty reduction
thanks to pensions
Note: The poverty line is defined as 60% of the median national income. Indicators of poverty relate
only to monetary income (without income in kind). The EU 10 includes the 10 countries that entered the
EU on May 1 2004. The reference year for Lithuania and Slovenia is 2000, and for Slovakia 2003.
Source: DS, 2004.
However, the poverty rate reduction is not also an indicator of the effectiveness of
welfare expenditures because two countries can achieve the same poverty rate reduction,
but with essentially different social expenditures. For this reason we have calculated indi-
cators of relative effectiveness of total transfers, by dividing the poverty rate reduction by
the costs of social security as percentage of GDP (Column 5 in Table 6). According to
this indicator, the most effective social security systems are in the new EU members
(Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) and of the old members, in Sweden and Ireland. The
Croatian social security system is almost identically as effective as the systems of these
countries. An interesting example is Ireland, which has the lowest costs of social securi-
ty, and yet these costs, it would appear, are relatively well targeted at the poor.
Table 6 Costs of social security and rates of poverty reduction (2001)
Poverty rate Costs of social Costs for old-age Poverty rate
reduction security and survivor pensions reduction /
(pensions and transfers) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) costs (%) of
social
security
Croatia 26 26.0 10.9 1.00
EU-25 25 – – –
EU-15 24 27.5 12.7 0.87
EU-10 25 – – –
Denmark 20 29.5 11.2 0.68
Germany 28 29.8 12.6 0.94
Greece 19 27.2 14.0 0.70
Italy 23 25.6 15.9 0.90
Ireland 15 14.6 3.6 1.03
Austria 26 28.4 14.1 0.92
Portugal 17 23.9 10.9 0.71
UK 23 27.2 12.6 0.85
France 25 30.0 13.1 0.83
Sweden 28 31.3 12.2 1.05
Czech R 28 – – –
Slovakia 29 19.1 7.6 1.52
Slovenia 26 25.6 11.6 1.02
Hungary 34 19.9 8.5 1.71
Poland 33 – – –
Estonia 24 – – –
Lithuania 27 – – –
Note: The concept of social security in the EU countries, according to ESPROS methodology, includes
expenditure for health care, pensions, family and child benefits, unemployment benefits, disability benefits,
housing assistance and welfare assistance. In Croatia social security costs relate to pensions, health
care, unemployment benefits, welfare, child allowances and benefits for war veterans, war invalids and
victims of the war.
Source: for EU countries, Eurostat (2004); for Croatia, Šuæur (2003); HZMO (2004).
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However, if we compare rates of poverty reduction only in connection with other
social transfers, then Croatia has the most effective “other social transfers” (along with
Sweden and Poland). Only these three countries, and the UK and Slovakia have rates of
poverty reduction deriving from other social transfers in excess of 10% (Figs. 6 and 7).
Since the category of “other social transfers” includes various types of benefits, we can-
not answer the question of what types of social transfers contribute most to the reduc-
tion of poverty.
On the other hand, together with Ireland, Croatia has the lowest rate of reduction of
poverty as a result of old-age and survivor pensions, of 8% (Fig. 7). This is considerably
less than in most EU countries, in which the poverty rate reduction ranges between 15
and 20% (with Hungary is the record holder with a 24% rate). The effect of pensions on
the poverty rate reduction depends primarily on the amount of the pensions and on how
much the elderly population is covered by the old-age pension system. According to
World Bank estimates (2000), about 20% of persons older than 60 in Croatia do not
have any pensions receipts. It is well known that pensions in the 1990s fell sharply in
comparison with average wages, although pensions expenditure calculated as a percent-
age of GDP is equal to that in EU countries (Table 6). In the last fifteen years, the aver-
age pension fell from 78% of the average wage in 1987 to only 44% in 2002. For the
sake of illustration, in Slovenia the average old-age pension in the 1993-1999 period
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was 75-77% of the average wage (Stropnik and Stanovnik, 2002). In connection with
these low pensions, it is important to state which income strata are more in receipt of
pensions. According to the World Bank study (2002), pension recipients in Croatia are
equally distributed among all income classes. For this reason some would conclude that
Figure 8 The effect of pensions and other social transfers on poverty reduction in the
Republic of Croatia in the 2001-2003 period (in %).
pensions in Croatia are not well targeted at the poor. Of course retirement insurance is
nominally not primarily meant for the poor, but for all those who have paid contribu-
tions. However, it is quite legitimate to require a pension system to have a strong effect
on the reduction of poverty in a situation when a considerable amount of the funds nec-
essary for the functioning of the pension system derives from the national budget and
from tax revenues. At current, the budget finances about 40% of total pension expendi-
tures (Bagariæ and Marušiæ, 2004:52). 
The poverty rate reduction in Croatia fell by 3% in 2002 as against 2001, because of
the reduced effect of pensions and other social transfers (Fig. 8). The increase in the
reduction of poverty in 2003 of 2% over 2002 should be ascribed exclusively to pensions.
3. Dilemmas concerning the official poverty line and the role of the minimum
income 
In Croatia at this moment there is no official poverty line. An official or national
poverty line is the poverty line that the government considers as appropriate for the
social conditions of this country, and so the trends and distribution of poverty are mea-
sured with respect to this line. Apart from that, the amounts of some benefits in the
social security system can be set according to this poverty line. It is most often used as
a criterion during the claim to some welfare assistance rights (all those whose incomes
are below that line or below a certain percentage of the line have the right to seek some
form of welfare assistance). It would be desirable for an official poverty line to be based
on some objective poverty line (absolute or relative), which is the practice in a large
number of countries.
There is no disputing that Croatia needs an official poverty line. This is, above all,
useful for government and the general public to be able in a simple manner to track and
understand poverty indicators. When data concerning poverty based on different lines
and equivalence scales (which give very different poverty rates) are published, it can be
confusing to the public because at the same time various poverty indicators are used that
the public is not capable of interpreting correctly. For the sake of simplicity, it is neces-
sary over the long term to monitor poverty indicators according to a uniform and single
criterion, that is, according to the same poverty line. Nor is this requirement (to have a
single poverty line) in dispute, but the choice of official poverty line is contested. The
choice of official poverty line depends on the opinions of experts and the viewpoints of
political authorities that have to undertake certain social intervention vis-?-vis poor
members of the society.
The Croatian Bureau of Statistics, which administers questionnaires concerning
household income and spending, has started to publish poverty indicators according to
the relative poverty line (the poverty line defined as a certain percentage of the median
national income). Actually, the official poverty line in Croatia in a certain sense has
been taken to be the official EU poverty line (60% of median national income). There
is no doubt that Croatia, for the sake of comparison with or future accession to the EU,
should start publishing poverty indicators harmonised with this line. However, it is dis-
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putable whether this line should be used as the only or primary standard by which wel-
fare assistance or some other universal benefits should be meted out. In other words, the
question arises as to whether Croatia does not perhaps need some absolute poverty line
as standard for welfare assistance benefits.
We think that Croatia does need an absolute poverty line, for a number of reasons.
First of all, the drawbacks of statistically relative poverty lines are well known (Šuæur,
2001). For example, it is a key question what these lines measure: poverty, or income
inequality? There are many views that these lines are a rough measure of income
inequality, and not of poverty. Since they are a reflection of macro-statistical indicators
(average wages, decile/quintile distributions of income), they are distant from the real
life of the poor. They do not tell us anything about how the poor live. For example, if
the poverty line is accepted as being 60% of median income, we will still have no infor-
mation about what needs can be met at this level of income, or what kind of life-style it
is possible to lead at this poverty threshold. Apart from that, it is not even necessary to
mention the arbitrariness involved in deciding at what level of macro-indicators the line
has to be set (50, 60 or 70% of the median).
On the other hand, one should draw attention to some of the reasons why the EU
and Eurostat prefer relative poverty lines. Some politicians and authors even show a
desire to negate any absolute poverty. It is said that the social systems in the western
countries have raised the living standard so much and thus eliminated the kind of pover-
ty that existed in the first half of the 20th century. In addition, the trend towards the rejec-
tion of the concept of poverty in the EU is linked with the great popularity of the con-
cept of social exclusion. We should say that the EU, from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s financed three programmes of the fight against poverty (Commins, 1995). The
fourth programme, although conceived, was not put into practice, since the governments
of some countries (mainly the UK and Germany) expressed their reserves about the use
of the term poverty in developed European societies.
Whether we want to accept only relative standards as indicators of poverty must
depend on our understanding of a welfare state. Is it enough for a welfare state to have
an impact on income inequalities, or does dealing with poverty come among the oblig-
ations of the welfare state? When the poverty line is set against the distribution of
income, which says nothing about real poverty and deprivation, then the question of
poverty only comes down to one of inequality. In fact, families that are below a pover-
ty line set according to income distribution cannot be called poor families any more,
only low income families. And so it is not surprising that Eurostat no longer uses the
expression “poverty rate”, but only the “at risk of poverty rate”.
Furthermore one has to say that the statistical office of the EU – Eurostat – has con-
sidered the possibility of introducing absolute poverty lines alongside relative lines
(Eurostat, 2001). The main problem in the acceptance of such a line for the EU coun-
tries must be the problem of defining absolute poverty in a single and uniform manner,
capable of being equally relevant to all the countries of the Union. But still, when an
absolute poverty line is defined or selected for one country only, the problem is far
smaller.
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The inappropriateness of linking welfare assistance only to a relative line is indi-
cated by the fact that the objective of welfare assistance is to provide “the satisfaction
of basic necessities of life” or “the social and cultural minimum”. The relative poverty
line does not say what these needs are and to what extent they can be met at that level
of income. Veit-Wilson (2000) claims that a state that does not provide welfare for all,
including the poor, is not a welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1990) thinks that a state can
be classified as a welfare state if the government provides “some basic modicum of wel-
fare for its citizens”. All modern states offer a certain minimum to some of their citizens,
but some states do not provide this to their most impoverished citizens. For Veit-Wilson
(1994; 1998) a welfare state must guarantee a minimum income for all, and the mini-
mum income for all is put into practice via welfare assistance (Stropnik, 2001). Thus a
government can link the minimum income to some statistical parameter, but in itself this
is not enough and cannot be a substitute for an empirical determination of the minimum
for life because it is not founded on some level of the realistic standard of living. A gov-
ernment has to define concretely the guaranteed level of the satisfaction of needs, in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living. Even P. Townsend, a vehement crit-
ic of absolute poverty, states that the “subsistence standard” in spite of its drawbacks
“gave coherence to social security and historical legitimacy to the formulation of citi-
zens’ rights and a basic income sufficient to meet needs” (Townsend and Gordon,
1991:42).
Finally, poverty in Croatia is often conceived as the inability to meet the basic
requirements of life of an individual or a family, and actually it is this kind of under-
standing of poverty that is at the pith and marrow of the definition of the line of absolute
poverty. Apart from that, there is a certain degree of experience with the definition of an
absolute poverty line in Croatia (for example, the World Bank line based on expendi-
tures for minimum dietary requirements or the so-called trade-union shopping-basket).
4. Conclusion
A comparative analysis shows that the rates of relative poverty in Croatia do not
deviate essentially from the EU average, although there are higher rates of poverty in
Croatia than in most EU countries. On the other hand, a partial insight into the dynam-
ics of poverty in the last six years draws attention to the stagnant nature of poverty in
Croatia (on the whole there have been no essential changes in the scope of poverty)
although it is too early to make any hard and fast conclusions, because this aspect of
poverty has still not been adequately researched.
From the structure of the poor population it can be seen that it is the elderly, the
retired and the unemployed that are at the greatest risk of poverty. It has also been seen
that single-person households, one-parent families and families with three or more chil-
dren have an above-average risk of poverty.
Because in this paper our interest has been directed to the role of social transfers, it
should be pointed out that the total transfer system is not less effective than the transfer
systems of most EU countries. The Croatian social transfer system is in fact even more
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effective than the average transfer system in the EU (measured according to the pover-
ty rate reduction). Only Sweden, Poland and Hungary have much more effective social
transfer systems. In fact, if we restrict ourselves only to social transfers and do not
include old-age and survivor pensions, then this social security sector is more effective
in Croatia than in any other country. This means that it is necessary to take with caution
the often-expressed off-the-cuff opinion that our transfer system is ineffective, although
it is necessary additionally to check the information about the high effectiveness of
social transfers not including old-age and survivor pensions (we should mention only the
low level of social assistance benefits or unemployment benefits). In order to arrive at a
more precise and objective estimate of the role of given transfers and answers to the
question what types of social transfers contribute most to a reduction in poverty, in
future research it will be necessary to study the effectiveness of each transfer pro-
gramme by itself.
Nevertheless, the relatively high efficiency of the total transfer system is overshad-
owed by the very ineffective old-age and survivor pension system, which should be par-
ticularly stressed, for this system is the largest transfer system, accounting for more than
40% of the expenditures for social security. The poverty rate reduction that can be attrib-
uted to old-age and survivor pensions is one of the lowest in the countries compared (on
average it is only half the reduction achieved in other countries). Our analysis has shown
that poverty is concentrated among the elderly and pensioners. Pension receipts are very
dependent on the state of the economy, trends in unemployment, regular payments of
pension contributions. This means that important instruments in the fight against pover-
ty lie outside the system of social transfers, or in the creation of new jobs and the devel-
opment of human capital. Bearing in mind, though, the likely rates of unemployment
and economic growth, social transfers will continue to have a key role in the alleviation
of poverty. Hence there is the necessity to reform the main social security systems. For
several years now Croatia has been carrying out a pension reform that is supposed to be
able to obviate poverty among those included in the pensions system. For the moment
it is hard to say how much the effect of this pension reform will be consistent with the
forecasts derived from simulations. Apart from that, pension reform will not settle the
question of poverty among the elderly population, for at least 20% of persons over 60
will not be covered by pension insurance. For this reason targeted programmes of wel-
fare assistance need to be provided for this section of the elderly population, because in
the foreseeable future it is hard to expect the introduction of any kind of basic pension.
Assuredly, the future policy with respect to poverty in Croatia will be powerfully affect-
ed by the success, or lack of it, of the pension (and health care) reform.
Speaking of other social transfers, a special problem is the inadequate protection of
the unemployed (Šošiæ, 2003). A relatively small number of the unemployed are cov-
ered by unemployment benefit (in the last 12 years between 10 and 20% of the unem-
ployed have received this benefit). There is still the problem of the lack of appropriate
protection for the long-term unemployed (unemployed for longer than one year), and
they constitute almost 50% of all unemployed.
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Welfare benefits are low and do not ensure the coverage of the basic necessities
(Šuæur, 2004). Since welfare benefits are meant exclusively for the poor, it would be
necessary to increase the expenditures on benefits, to define the minimum income in a
more objective way and to adjust the amount of the welfare benefit in line with the rise
in the costs of living (Šuæur, 2000; 2004). But real manoeuvring space for the increase
in the amount of welfare benefits is fairly restricted because of the low level of benefits
in the other social security sectors.
Understanding of the connections between social transfers and poverty is a key ele-
ment in the formation of an effective welfare policy. However, it should also be under-
stood that the system of social transfers has got its limits in the endeavours to alleviate
or reduce poverty (perhaps long-term). In some cases, social transfers can only incon-
siderably reduce poverty, which means that important instruments for the reduction of
poverty or economic inequalities are outside the scope of social policy (in wage policy,
for example).
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